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Chancellor of the Exchequer (1924-29) and the 
Return to the Gold Standard
The general election of 29 October 1924 saw Winston Churchill return to 
parliament as Constitutionalist MP for Epping after two years in the political 
wilderness. It also saw Stanley Baldwin swept back to Number 10 on a 
Conservative landslide. Speculation about whether Baldwin would cement 
Churchill’s drift from the Liberal fold by offering him office surfaced during the 
election campaign. Churchill nevertheless thought ‘it very unlikely that I shall 
be invited to join the Government, as owing to the size of the majority it will 
probably be composed only of impeccable Conservatives’.1 Because of his anti-
socialist credentials, his ability to reassure wavering Liberals through his 
opposition to protectionism – dropped by Baldwin after its rejection in the 1923 
general election2 – and concern he could prove a rallying point for backbench 
malcontents, there was however much to commend giving Churchill a post. To 
his surprise, Baldwin offered Churchill the long-coveted office of Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, briefly held by his father before his ill-conceived resignation in 
1887. Having arranged a meeting with his Labour predecessor, Philip Snowden, 
about outstanding business the new Chancellor set to work.3 Marking his 
political transition, a few days later Churchill resigned from the National 
Liberal Club.4
The various file series relating to Churchill’s period at the Treasury from 1924-
29 are broadly arranged chronologically, with additional materials inserted at 
the end. Hence the CHAR22 series of Cabinet-related papers opens with files 
dating from 1919-22, overlaps with his Chancellorship from CHAR22/19 
onwards, but ends at CHAR22/247 with a file of miscellaneous notes from 
c1925. CHAR22/28-47, 85-106, 152-166, 191-211, 228-235 largely consist of 
Cabinet memoranda and correspondence. There are also sets of Cabinet 
conclusions for 1928-29 at CHAR22/212-213 and 236-238.5 
1 CHAR2/136/4: WSC to Sir Alan Burgoyne, 4 November 1924; see also CHAR2/136/6: WSC to 
James Erskine, 5 November 1924.
2 For instance, in his election speech at Gravesend, 25 October 1924, noted in CHAR18/3/82-9: 
author unknown, December 1924.
3 CHAR18/1/6: WSC to Philip Snowden, 17 November 1924.
4 CHAR2/136/60: Clarice Fisher to Secretary, National Liberal Club, 21 November 1924.
5 For 1924-28 the CAB23 and CAB24 files in The National Archives would need to be consulted.
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CHAR22 additionally includes papers of various Cabinet committees Churchill 
was a member of. Many of these he naturally served on as Chancellor, including 
the committee on unemployment (CHAR22/24-5, 22/70-73) and the standing 
committee on expenditure (CHAR22/49-52, 107-8, 168-9). There were 
committees to which Churchill was appointed because of previous involvement 
with their subjects, including the Irish border dispute (CHAR22/53-55) or 
House of Lords reform (CHAR22/58-61, 109, 171). There are also the runs of 
Foreign Office prints he insisted on receiving (CHAR22/26, 22/77, 22/146, 
22/184-5, 22/223, 22/245) against the initial opposition of the Foreign 
Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain.6 Surprisingly, however, there are no 
Committee of Imperial Defence papers, though Churchill’s involvement in the 
important Imperial Conference of 1926 is reflected in CHAR22/136-40.
There is little of direct relevance to Churchill’s Chancellorship in the personal 
materials in the CHAR1 series, even in the correspondence with Clementine 
(CHAR1/158, 1/179). His wife only occasionally intervened in Treasury policy, 
despite sympathising with a perfume manufacturer who had written to Churchill 
urging taxation of advertisements for foreign products.7
More directly useful are the public and political papers in the CHAR2 series. 
Relevant files begin with CHAR2/138 containing letters welcoming Churchill’s 
return to Parliament and office and CHAR2/136, largely consisting of letters 
and speeches by others, generally about the supposed Communist threat in the 
aftermath of a red scare election. Meanwhile, for context on a running theme of 
Churchill’s Chancellorship,8 the management of the Anglo-Persian oil company 
in which Churchill secured a controlling government interest in 1914 see 
CHAR2/130.
Parliamentary and platform speeches, speech notes and related press cuttings 
are found in the CHAR9 series, with the relevant files running from CHAR9/68 
to 9/89. Constituency reactions to Churchill’s policies and their political impact 
can meanwhile be traced in the CHAR7 series dealing with his role as MP for 
Epping, the relevant files being the correspondence in CHAR7/1-6.
6 CHAR18/1/13-21: correspondence with Sir Austen Chamberlain 21-22 November 1924.
7 CHAR2/158/11: CSC to W. F. Charles, 12 May 1928. She commented on the coal dispute in 
CHAR1/179/44: CSC to WSC, 9 September 1926.
8 CHAR2/142/46: Lord Southborough to Edward Marsh, 10 October 1925; CHAR18/75/61-6: WSC to 
Sir Richard Hopkins, 18 May 1928.
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The most useful files are the Treasury documents contained in the 107 files of 
the CHAR18 series. The various Budget books and supporting tables and 
memoranda are in CHAR18/7 (1925), 18/25 (1926), 18/40 (1927), 18/71 
(1928), 18/96-7 (1929). Other files generally consist either of civil servants’ 
correspondence on policy issues or, as in CHAR18/75, Churchill’s minutes on 
various subjects. Not all were strictly departmental: the King’s private secretary, 
for instance, wrote asking Churchill what to do with Prince George. ‘He must 
not be idle: the country pay him £10,000 a year and may naturally ask “What 
for?”’ Although not industrious, he had ‘nice manners, good looks’, so was sent 
briefly to the Foreign Office.9
There were numerous financial problems confronting the new Chancellor. 
Churchill’s own finances were as constrained as those of the state. Nevertheless, 
the emoluments of office emboldened him to write to Lloyds Bank about 
repaying his loan and overdraft. The reply expressed the ‘hope you may be able 
to work out some original idea and perform the impossible task of making two 
and two produce five’ to similarly address the nation’s finances.10 Clearly he did 
not make the hoped-for progress in his personal finances: shortly after leaving 
office his overdraft stood at £10,004 and Lloyds refused to advance him more 
monies.11 Making progress with the nation’s enormous debts, greatly 
exacerbated as they were by the recent war of 1914-18, was no less challenging.
By 1920 the national debt had increased from £1bn to £5.4bn.12 Furthermore, 
notwithstanding the efforts of Coalition ministers, including Churchill, to tackle 
increased expenditure in the aftermath of the war, government spending as a 
share of gross domestic product had still doubled from 11.9% to 23.6% by 
1924, at which level it remained until 1939.13 Politically there were middle-class 
pressures to try to curb expenditure and the perceived associated risks of 
inflation and undermining of the currency. Churchill therefore had to try to 
balance the books by some combination of reducing spending and/or raising 
taxation. Tax levels had, however, already greatly increased as a result of the 
war, stirring middle-class discontent. At the same time, whilst radical demands 
9 CHAR18/101/27-9: Stamfordham to WSC, 16 March 1929.
10 CHAR28/144B/236-7: WSC to W. Bernau, 8 November 1924, Bernau to WSC 11 November 1924.
11 CHAR28/145/8-9: Bernau to WSC, 11 October 1929.
12 Ranald Michie, ‘The City of London and the British Government: The Changing Relationship’ in 
Ranald Michie and Philip Williamson (eds) The British Government and the City of London in the 
Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p.34.
13 Martin Daunton ‘Churchill at the Treasury: Remaking Conservative Taxation Policy 1924-1929’, 
Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire, 75/4 (1997), p.1063.
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for the conscription of the wealth of holders of the national debt in the form of a 
capital levy seem to have faded, Churchill was also conscious of class tensions 
heightened by the effects of wartime inflation on wages and by the surge of 
post-war unemployment. Domestically the new Chancellor thus faced an 
interlocking series of political, economic and fiscal challenges. As his own 
memoranda from the period testify, managing these often involved choices in 
terms of the effects on different sections of British society and economy: 
commenting for instance in 1926 ‘I would rather see Finance less proud and 
Industry more content’.14
Externally there was the additional problem of inter-Allied war debts. Pursuing 
Russian debts was futile, but Churchill hoped that much could be recovered 
from France and Italy.15 The August 1924 Dawes Plan to restore war reparation 
payments, he initially believed, also created a chance of getting up to £25m per 
annum out of Germany,16 helping in turn to address the £900m Britain owed the 
United States.17 
Churchill, notwithstanding his familial ties to that country, appreciated 
contemporary concerns that these debts rendered Britain dependent upon the 
USA. They also dried up credit availability in debtor nations, whilst America’s 
position as ultimate creditor ensured that £300m of gold reserves had 
unproductively accumulated in American vaults. To officials advocating a 
restoration of the Gold Standard abandoned in 1919 he therefore asked, would 
this not simply be rewarding the Americans for their selfishness?18 Additionally 
he was aware that, whilst easy to attain, keeping the Gold Standard ‘will require 
a most strict policy of debt repayment and a high standard of credit’.19 The 
disciplines resulting might be desirable, but might damage the patient. Invoking 
John Maynard Keynes’ criticisms, Churchill raised with Sir Otto Niemeyer, the 
financial controller of the Treasury, the paradox whereby, partly as a result of 
the deflationary policies pursued to create circumstances in which the Gold 
14 CHAR18/12A/96-9: WSC to Niemeyer, 22 February 1925.
15 CHAR18/2/10-11: WSC to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 1 December 1924. On the agreement reached 
with France in 1925 see CHAR2/179/13-14, 18/11 and 18/12A.
16 CHAR18/3/19-20: WSC to Sir Otto Niemeyer, 25 November 1924.
17 Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill V (1922-1939), (London: Heinemann, 1976), p.68n. 
18 CHAR18/12A/8: WSC to Niemeyer, 2 January 1925.
19 CHAR18/2/62-71: WSC to Baldwin, 13 December 1924.
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Standard might be restored, ‘The community lacks goods and a million and a 
quarter people lack work’. 20 
Keynes’ alternative was a managed currency. However, as the city editor of The 
Times put it on 19 March 1925: ‘A managed currency would be entirely at the 
mercy of politicians with big programmes’. As the former Treasury official, Sir 
John Bradbury, explained, the Gold Standard instead was ‘knave-proof’.21 To 
resolve these debates Churchill arranged a dinner party on 17 March 1925, 
attended by Bradbury and Niemeyer for the gold bugs and Keynes and former 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald McKenna, as sceptics.22 This seems to 
have persuaded Churchill that the Gold Standard, by providing an external price 
discipline, would facilitate a non-inflationary expansion to tackle his economic 
paradox.
As the great Swedish economist, Gustav Cassel, explained in 1923, the Gold 
Standard worked by ‘keeping the value of the currency of the country at a 
constant par with gold’. Because gold was a scarce commodity and under the 
Gold Standard all currencies were pegged to its value,23 this meant that the 
internal purchasing power of currencies had to be maintained. Governments 
could not simply inflate to meet budget deficits. For the same reason, Cassel 
pointed out, 
There must also be an equilibrium in the balance of payment between the 
country and the outside world at least to the extent that the country is not 
forced to sell its currency abroad as an object of speculation in order to 
fill up the deficit.24
This is what Churchill meant in 1925 when he argued that the Gold Standard 
would ‘shackle us to reality’.25
With Germany, the USA and Canada already on the Gold Standard and South 
Africa, Australia and New Zealand only awaiting Britain’s signal to join, ‘The 
benefit of a uniform standard of value....throughout the British Empire and 
20 CHAR18/12A/96-9: WSC to Niemeyer, 22 February 1925.
21 Cited in Robert Boyce ‘Government-City of London relations under the gold standard 1925-31’ in 
Michie and Williamson, pp.217-18.
22 See Paul Addison, Churchill on the Home Front 1900-1955, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1992), 
chap.7, esp. pp.246-8.
23 In Britain’s case at £3/17/10¼ per ounce, restoring the pre-war parity with the dollar of £1 = $4.86.
24 Gustav Cassel, ‘The Restoration of the Gold Standard’ Economica 9 (1923), pp.173-4.
25 House of Commons Debates, 5th ser., Vol.183, Col.671, 4 May 1925.
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through a very large part of the world cannot be over-estimated’.26 Domestically 
Churchill argued it would prevent the price fluctuations that help speculators 
but defraud wage-earners.27 The resulting price stability might also encourage 
the Americans to deploy their gold to secure ‘a slow, gradual, healthy and 
perfectly legitimate expansion of credit all over the world’. ‘The resulting 
growth of consuming power internationally’, Churchill noted, ‘is bound to react 
favourably upon us. We cannot live without exports to the markets of the 
world’.28 Furthermore, a lower exchange rate would mean larger interest 
payments to the US. On such grounds, having secured $300m in credits,29 
Churchill announced a return to the Gold Standard to wide approval in his 1925 
Budget. 
Churchill soon had to defend his decision. Indeed, he fell out with his friend, 
Lord Beaverbrook, over it.30 In the Commons he imagined Beaverbrook’s 
newspaper, the Daily Express, pointing out ‘What did we tell you would follow 
the gold standard?’31 The occasion was the wage reductions posted by mine 
owners hit by falling exports and prices and the government’s resulting decision 
to give a £10m subsidy for the coal industry for nine months. In contemporary, 
apparently unused, speech notes he acknowledged that the Gold Standard 
‘forms [a] very convenient explanation [for] most sufferings [of] humanity’. 
The government, however, was unrepentant, whilst Keynes’ managed currency 
alternative was lambasted as likely to prove inflationary and, by encouraging 
easy credit, lead to unsustainable expansion.32 Privately Churchill was not so 
sanguine, writing to Niemeyer a few days earlier that coal exports were higher 
in 1923 than 1913 because the exchange rate was then $4.65, not $4.86.33 
The situation could be eased, as a lengthy paper of indeterminate authorship 
hopefully concluded in December 1925, if the US wrote down international 
26 CHAR18/7/150-64: WSC to George V, 23 April 1925.
27 CHAR9/73/17: The Times 17 September 1925, report of WSC’s speech at Midland Conservative 
Club, Birmingham, 16 September 1925.
28 CHAR9/71/62-93: Speech notes for Gold Standard Bill, 2nd Reading, 4 May 1925. The full text is in 
House of Commons Debates, 5th ser., Vol.183, Cols.663-81. 
(http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1925/may/04/gold-standard-bill). 
29 CHAR18/8/162: E. C. Grenfell to WSC, 1 May 1925.
30 See their correspondence in October and November 1925 in CHAR2/142/61-2, 71-2, 77-89, 92-3, 
99.
31 CHAR9/72A/42-60: Speech notes for coal subsidy, 6 August 1925. The full text is in House of 
Commons Debates, 5th ser., Vol.187, Col.1684 
(http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1925/aug/06/coal-mining-industry-subvention).
32 CHAR9/72A/62-7: ‘Appropriations Bill (Gold Standard) speech notes, 6 August 1925.
33 CHAR18/12B/219: WSC to Niemeyer, 2 August 1925.
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debts. Meanwhile, it was exacerbated by the 1921 Washington naval treaty,34 
and resulting Admiralty anxiety to rearm against the consequent Japanese naval 
preponderance in the Pacific. A year earlier Churchill complained, ‘To accept 
these armament increases is to sterilize and paralyse the whole policy of the 
Government….We shall be a Naval Parliament busily preparing our Navy for 
some great imminent shock’. Dismissing ‘the slightest chance’ of war with 
Japan ‘in our lifetime’ he suggested Admiralty planning should be ‘on the basis 
that no naval war against a first class Navy is likely to take place in the next 
twenty years’.35
Budgetary savings, in which naval expenditure perennially loomed large, were 
not only required for a successful return to the Gold Standard, but also to allow 
other measures promoting economic recovery.36 One possible solution was 
imperial development: an enthusiasm of the Colonial Secretary, Leo Amery (see 
CHAR22/44, 22/46, 22/232), and a theme of the 1926 Imperial Conference (see 
CHAR22/97). Churchill instead growled, apparently to the Treasury’s 
permanent secretary, Sir Warren Fisher, about the fallacy ‘that a great loan for 
colonial development would be a permanent remedy for unemployment’.37 He 
was no more enthusiastic about encouraging the unemployed to settle in the 
empire or on Forestry Commission land.38 Amery, however, urged Cabinet that 
colonial development could be ‘An Employment Policy for the Election’,39 
though it fell to the succeeding Labour government to pass his Bill.
Churchill had been no more enthusiastic about domestic infrastructure 
investment at the time of the 1921 Trade Facilities Act [TFA]. The credits 
provided under this legislation conflicted with his desire to reduce debt, hence 
his 1926 Budget announcement ending this scheme in 1927. In this he was at 
one with Treasury officials who noted that, if ‘the State steps in with a promise 
of assistance....efforts of self-help will be retarded and the ultimate 
reorganisation of industry postponed’.40 Similarly, Churchill was concerned at 
possible misuse of the 1925-26 coal subsidy merely to rebuild profits.41 Even 
the £40-50m spent on electricity reorganisation (see CHAR22/62-4) he 
34 CHAR2/144/6-8, 19-20: ‘Anglo-American Relations’, December 1925, pp.6-8, 19-20. 
35 CHAR18/2/62-71: WSC to Baldwin, 13 December 1924.
36 CHAR18/7/79-81: Niemeyer to WSC, 25 November 1924.
37 CHAR18/103/10: WSC to Fisher, 13 February 1929.
38 CHAR18/75/93-5: WSC to P. J. Grigg [WSC’s Principal Private Secretary], 21 June 1928.
39 CHAR22/238/22: Cabinet Conclusions, CC(17)29.1, 17 April 1929.
40 CHAR18/106/14-15: Sir Horace Hamilton to Fisher, 16 October 1928.
41 CHAR18/30A/172: WSC to Sir George Barstow, 20 March 1926.
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condemned in March 1929 as monies ‘brutally withdrawn from industry and 
enterprise’.42 
He preferred to use tax relief rather than direct subsidies, for instance, to 
encourage consolidation in the steel industry or the 1928 Armstrong-Vickers 
merger.43 His boldest tax relief scheme, in the 1928 Budget, however was the 
£30m reduction in the burden of local rates on industry and agriculture.44 
Churchill’s aim was to staunch the decline of staple industries and their flight to 
greenfield sites, thus helping investment and tackling stubbornly high rates of 
unemployment. The development of this scheme is the focus of files 
CHAR18/64-5, 18/85-93, whilst additional relevant material is in CHAR18/73, 
9/84, 9/86 and 7/106B . It was part-funded by a tax on petrol introduced in 1928 
(see CHAR18/66 and 18/94-5).
Churchill preferred to help the railways and persuaded the Cabinet to include 
them in the derating proposals.45 He followed this in his 1929 Budget by 
responding to calls in the Daily Express for rail reorganisation by abolishing the 
Passenger Duty in return for promises of capital investments of the £6.5m 
proceeds (see CHAR18/105). 
Tax relief for individuals rather than businesses was the centrepiece of 
Churchill’s first Budget in 1925. Taking the view that ‘the rich, whether idle or 
not, are already taxed in this country to the very highest point compatible with 
the accumulation of capital for future production’,46 he reduced income tax – 
then only paid by a minority, often on dividends – from 22.5 to 20 per cent. 
Churchill also provided relief for less wealthy payers of supertax, taking the 
view that it ‘hampers initiative and enterprise’.47 These measures were balanced 
politically by developing the social insurance he and Lloyd George had 
promoted in his pre-war Liberal guise,48 enhanced benefits helping to secure 
middle-class support for the more onerous inter-war tax regime.49 Churchill’s 
42 CHAR18/100/137-8: Note by WSC (31 March 1929) at foot of Sir Francis Floud to Hopkins, 28 
March 1929.
43 CHAR18/12B/226-7: WSC to Niemeyer, 25 August 1925. CHAR18/103: WSC to Fisher, 21 March 
1929.
44 CHAR18/64/1-2: WSC to Alfred Hurst, 4 June 1927.
45 A concern raised earlier in CHAR18/12B/232: WSC to Niemeyer, 27 August 1925.
46 CHAR18/2/43-5: WSC to Lord Salisbury, 9 December 1924.
47 CHAR18/7/150-64: WSC to George V, 23 April 1925.
48 CHAR18/7/89-94: WSC to Baldwin, 24 November 1924.
49 Daunton, pp.1065f.
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entreaties to Neville Chamberlain, who as Minister of Health led on the scheme, 
to also employ Liberals on its development however fell on deaf ears.50
The idea originated with a party inquiry set up by Baldwin in 1922. The 
resulting scheme for old age pensioners, widows and orphans needed to be 
contributory, Churchill stated, both to build personal responsibility and to 
ensure affordability.51 It was affordable as the cost of war pensions was 
gradually declining and socially desirable because ‘it will anchor the mass of 
the nation to an ordered system of society and to continuity in national life’.52M
aterial about this scheme can be found in CHAR18/19, supplemented by 
CHAR18/12. Churchill’s correspondence with Chamberlain on this matter is in 
CHAR22/34, and the report of the Government Actuary on its implications in 
CHAR22/35 (see also CHAR22/39). On extending this benefit to the devolved 
statelet of Northern Ireland see CHAR22/75.
Whilst relieving pensioners, Churchill was also concerned to spread ‘our 
present burden of debt more broadly over the shoulders of posterity’. This both 
entailed balancing the books on an annualised basis through savings or 
increased taxes, as well as reducing the debt burden itself through either a 
sinking fund or conversion from short to long securities.53 Churchill’s 
preference was the latter. After Lord Colwyn in 1926 recommended a sinking 
fund of £75m rising to £100m a year he angrily criticised ‘all this folly’ 
Niemeyer had ‘been shoving in Colwyn’s mouth’. He felt that redeeming debt 
in this way used tax revenues to underpin the value of government debt held by 
financiers.54 This was undesirable in terms of the expansion Churchill sought in 
two ways. Firstly, businessmen under the existing tax regime were ‘at a great 
disadvantage compared to the rentier merchant or financier’.55 Secondly, 
because taxes paid by businesses are passed onto consumers, it diminished the 
latter’s ability to act as ‘a stimulus to future production’; hence Churchill ended 
his diatribe to Niemeyer with a ringing endorsement of tax cuts.56 
Tax relief schemes required balancing expenditure savings. This was a 
challenge. The Admiralty, where Churchill had served as First Lord in 1911-15, 
proved particularly frustrating. There is a well-founded view, he complained, 
50 CHAR18/2/90-4: WSC to Neville Chamberlain, 30 December 1924.
51 CHAR18/8/136-9: WSC to Baldwin, 17 April 1925.
52 CHAR18/7/150-64: WSC to George V, 23 April 1925.
53 CHAR18/3/25: WSC to Niemeyer, 26 November 1924.
54 CHAR18/30B/309-14: WSC to Niemeyer, 28 October 1926.
55 CHAR18/30A/129-30: WSC to Hopkins, 7 March 1926.
56 CHAR18/30B/309-14: WSC to Niemeyer, 28 October 1926.
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‘that the Admiralty gives less value for money than either of the other two 
services’.57 His latest successor, W. C. Bridgeman, entered office asking for a 
ballooning budget of £65.7m,58 prompting the creation of a Cabinet committee 
on the naval programme (CHAR22/65-69, 22/172-6). Several of the Treasury 
files are dominated by this topic (CHAR18/4-6, 18/14, 18/32-33), whilst 
additional material can be found in CHAR22/30, 22/136, 22/138, 22/166, 
22/198, 22/209, 22/236, 18/44-46, 18/48-9. 
One consequence of naval anxiety about Japan was the costly construction of 
the Singapore naval base announced by the previous Conservative government 
in 1923. Drawing on prior experience at the Colonial Office, Churchill 
unsuccessfully suggested that the cheapest and most effective way to defend it 
was by aeroplanes, rather than the guns that were in due course installed with 
disastrous consequences.59 Discussions on the base’s progress are found in 
CHAR22/22, 22/66, 22/161, 22/210 and 22/213.
An innovation in tackling the naval budget was the ‘shadow cut’, a budgeting 
device which assumed that Admiralty construction contracts would be behind 
schedule but gave provision for contingency funding if necessary.60 By such 
processes Churchill managed to bring the naval budget back down to £55.8m by 
1929.61 More radically, though less successfully, he further suggested savings 
by pooling government research and combining the services.62
Churchill’s room for manoeuvre on indirect taxes was restricted by his free 
trade credentials. Sensitivity to calls for Protectionism is reflected in 
CHAR18/78, a file in response to calls from the right-wing Tory MP, Henry 
Page-Croft, for more safeguarding. Churchill nevertheless in 1925 reintroduced 
the wartime McKenna duties, added a new silk duty and increased imperial 
preference on various Empire foodstuffs.  In 1926 he extended the McKenna 
duties to commercial vehicles. Relevant correspondence with the President of 
the Board of Trade, Philip Cunliffe-Lister, is in CHAR22/28-29, 22/40, 22/42, 
57 CHAR18/77/2-4: WSC to Baldwin, 29 January 1928.
58 CHAR18/4/19-26: Bridgeman to WSC, 15 January 1925.
59 CHAR18/2/60-1: WSC to Samuel Hoare, 12 December 1924.
60 CHAR18/4/32-4: WSC to Bridgeman, 6 February 1925; CHAR18/32/47: Bridgeman to WSC, 10 
February 1927.
61 CHAR18/102/23-4: WSC to Bridgeman, 14 February 1929; CHAR18/7/79: Niemeyer to WSC, 25 
November 1924.
62 CHAR18/30A/113: WSC to Barstow, 20 February 1926; CHAR18/30A/166-71: WSC to Baldwin, 19 
March 1926.
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22/44, 22/46, 22/92, 22/155, 22/157, 22/196-9, 22/236, 22/238, 18/10 and 
18/30. With the petrol duty the proportion of revenue from indirect taxes rose 
from 33 to 35.6 per cent under Churchill’s Chancellorship.63 He began this 
worrying that increasing consumption might be at the expense of ‘the capital 
reserves of individuals and businesses’, hence his shift from income to indirect 
taxes.64 The latter were, however, primarily for revenue purposes on luxury 
goods bought by the relatively well-off, such as motorists.65 The 1925 proposals 
for safeguarding the iron and steel industry, covered in CHAR18/20 and 22/38, 
were therefore successfully resisted because they constituted a move towards 
the general tariff Baldwin was pledged not to introduce.66
Increasing indirect tax revenues were achieved despite a fall in the yield from 
their main component, beer duties. Bad summers and the effects of the 1926 
coal strike both depressed beer consumption: by 1928 the deficiency on the 
yield against budget was £1.5m.67 Right from the start, however, Churchill 
seems to have had in mind an alternative: betting.68 This reflected his view that 
luxuries and indulgences should be taxed. Churchill also thought it might yield 
£10m. Correspondence and memoranda tracing its implementation and effects 
from 1 November 1926 is in CHAR18/36-8, 18/50-60, 18/79-80, 18/104 and 
22/89. 
These proved more complex than envisaged. There was the problem of whether 
the legislation could be circumvented through Ireland, hence the abortive 
consideration of legislation prohibiting overseas betting (CHAR18/39, 18/84). It 
was also found that large numbers of bookmakers traded both legally and 
illegally and that tax evasion was widespread. To tackle the dishonest 
bookmaker – and increase revenue – Churchill supported the private bill 
introducing the recently invented totalisator betting system to the UK (see 
CHAR18/59, 18/81-3, 22/221 and 2/158/115).69
63 CHAR18/100/186-7: Hamilton to Grigg, 13 April 1929.
64 CHAR18/7/64-6: WSC to Hamilton, 16 November 1924.
65 CHAR18/64/3-13: WSC to Baldwin, 6 June 1927.
66 CHAR18/11/15-22: WSC to Baldwin, 12 June 1925.
67 CHAR18/100/19: CWH to Grigg, 12 July 1928; CHAR18/100/116-20: WSC to Floud, 20 March 
1929.
68 CHAR2/141/5: Lord d’Abernon to WSC, 13 January 1925.
69 CHAR9/83A/18-110: Background documents and speech notes for 16 March 1928. The full text is 
in House of Commons Debates, 5th ser., Vol.214, Cols.2347-55 
(http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1928/mar/16/racecourse-betting-bill). 
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Not least, Conservative Central Office was concerned that ‘we shall be 
somewhat embarrassed politically over the Betting tax’,70 prompting Churchill’s 
determination to avoid prosecutions.71 Swiftly the trade moved to propose 
various alternatives to Churchill’s turnover tax and to threaten anti-government 
political campaigns.72 In the run-up to the 1929 election their interventions 
allegedly damaged Conservative chances in several by-elections.73 In the end 
Churchill tried to defuse the situation by replacing the betting tax with licence 
duties.74
This was not the only fiscal measure taken with an eye to the coming campaign. 
Most conspicuous was the removal of tea duty in the 1929 Budget: Churchill’s 
young acolyte, Harold Macmillan, wrote of this, ‘What a gambit!....Snowden 
will grind his teeth over this’.75 The Prime Minister also sent congratulations on 
a ‘brilliant’ Budget speech.76 It was insufficient. A week earlier Macmillan had 
warned of the risk of 1906 style debacle.77 In the event, although the Tories won 
the most votes in the election of 30 May 1929, Labour won the most seats. It 
was to be ten years before Churchill again held office.
Churchill’s time at the Treasury was not without frustrations. The Chancellor 
complained both of not being consulted about, for instance, spending £300,000 
on new note issues,78 and of the ‘lack of a system of docketing and minuting’.79 
Churchill clearly benefited from the advice of his officials, but that did not 
mean he invariably agreed with them. He could rail that ‘The Niemeyer attitude 
of letting everything smash into bankruptcy and unemployment so that 
reconstruction can be built up upon the ruins is neither sound economics nor 
wise policy’.80 
Simply reducing costs on the household budget through deflationary policies 
was no longer enough. During Churchill’s Chancellorship the cost of living for 
70 CHAR18/37/28: Pembroke Wicks to J. C. C. Davidson [Conservative Party Chairman], 12 October 
1926.
71 CHAR18/37/41-2: Hamilton to Sir John Anderson, 13 November 1926.
72 CHAR18/37/96-7: Grigg to Hamilton, 3 December 1926.
73 CHAR18/104/1-2: Lionel Phillips to WSC, 8 February 1929; CHAR2/164/2-3: Lord Derby to WSC, 
23 February 1929.
74 CHAR18/101/33: WSC to Lord Stanley, 21 March 1929.
75 CHAR18/101/42-3: Macmillan to WSC, 8 April 1929.
76 CHAR18/101/55: Baldwin to WSC, 16 April 1929.
77 CHAR18/101/34-41: Macmillan to WSC, 27 March 1929.
78 CHAR18/75/176-7: WSC to Fisher, 14 September 1928.
79 CHAR18/30B/188-91: WSC to Fisher, 28 March 1926.
80 CHAR18/75/134-7: WSC to Hopkins, 22 July 1928.
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working-class households fell by 5 per cent.81 However, because this was a 
result of falling prices whilst wages remained static, people did not feel better 
off. Meanwhile, trade was subdued and unemployment remained persistently 
high. Churchill did make some progress on debt reductions: the debt principal 
fell by £107m and the interest charges, mainly through sinking funds rather than 
conversions, declined by £11m per annum.82 However, both in tackling 
unemployment and in economising, Churchill admitted ‘All my efforts, such as 
they have been, have failed’. Derating was intended to address this, 
economically by aiding ‘the producing class’, and politically by resolving a 
fractious debate about block grants to local government (see CHAR18/62-3).83
Churchill switched to these internal attempts to stimulate the economy as 
prospects of achieving external agreement to reduce debt and promote trade 
faded: he complained ‘We have suffered unequalled ill-usage having been 
committed to paying the American debt irrespective of reparations, having had 
to scale down to a fourth or a fifth of their values the debts due to us from 
France and Italy.’84 The situation was exacerbated by the American naval 
disarmament initiative at Geneva in 1927, which thereafter framed internal 
discussions on naval expenditure (see CHAR22/155, 22/182, 22/205, 22/208, 
22/213). This had the unintended consequence of increasing French insecurity, 
leading them to demand further reductions of their debt repayments. 
These external problems stymied the return to the Gold Standard, a decision 
which has always overshadowed Churchill’s Chancellorship. It did not lead to 
the hoped-for global recovery. Cassel had anticipated that it ought to help 
reduce the distorting effect of America’s dominant influence on international 
finance.85 Instead, such American credit as was made available was often short-
term and inflationary, as the US investment in Germany under the Dawes Plan 
proved. Churchill was in New York as the stock exchange crashed in October 
1929,86 followed by a recall of American funds from Germany. The subsequent 
panic-selling of foreign exchange for gold by European central banks was to 
drive Britain back off the Gold Standard on 21 September 1931.
81 CHAR18/100/177: ‘The movement of wages and cost of living 1924-9’, 12 April 1929.
82 CHAR18/100/89-98: Hopkins to Grigg, 18 March 1929.
83 CHAR18/64/3-13: WSC to Baldwin, 6 June 1927.
84 CHAR18/75/167-73: WSC to Fisher, 14 September 1928.
85 CHAR22/87/46: CP55(26), WSC ‘The Gold Standard’, 10 February 1926. Cassel’s article from the 
Times Annual Financial and Commercial Review (9 February 1926) is at pp.6-9.
86 Addison, p.287.
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This denouement should not necessarily damn the 1925 decision. Churchill 
continued to maintain ‘There is nothing wrong with the gold standard, but how 
could the gold standard be enforced if there were no gold?....two-thirds of the 
gold has been impounded’ by the French and Americans.87 These imbalances 
were to depress prices, credit and thereby trade.88 This prevented the non-
inflationary expansion Churchill sought. It should not, however, distract from 
his efforts creatively to tackle the many challenges he confronted while at the 
Treasury.
87 House of Commons Debates, 5th ser., vol. 256, cols. 701-3, 15 September 1931 
(http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1931/sep/15/standard-rate-of-tax-for-1931-2-and).  
88 CHAR1/401B/279: WSC to Lawrence Sloan, 11 January 1932. See also CHAR2/186.
